Some Thoughts on Moral Relativism and PD 39
The Facts of Moral Diversity
In recent months, several coups in West Africa, as well as changes to educational policies in Algeria (former French colony that recently began a switch to English instead of French as a second language), have made it clear that Africans are rejecting the French language and its associated Enlightenment values. Due to the huge cultural diversity in Africa, the French language had served to unify dozens of countries, many of which (like Senegal) had achieved considerable stability and democracy as part of the Francophonie.
The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, two decades after helping to orchestrate the worst terrorist attack in US history, also demonstrates that well-meaning attempts to export cultural goods (like “democracy”) have failed, and that freedom can’t be exported or imposed. Some cultural groups are hostile, even terrified, of freedom.
Today, most of us are living in a post-colonial paradigm (a fact which most of us welcome), but this also comes with confusion of values. The postmodern rejection of certainty, coupled with the post-truth and anti-truth praxis advanced by nativist groups and opportunistic parties and media outlets, have contributed to a general confusion of values.
Nietzsche posited that Christianity was inherently nihilistic and it would lead to this. Like the proverbial Yin and Yang, where each thing contains the root of its opposite thing, the problems of moral relativism seem to have their roots in universalizing narratives. In the essay Wrestling with Relativism, Bernard Williams says:
you can’t coherently say that All moral truth is relative to a culture and espouse a non-relative moral rule that all cultures should respect one another. The vulgar relativist is putting forward toleration as a universal moral principle, but this is flat-out inconsistent with moral relativism itself.
In pages 23-24 of his book titled Moral Relativism, Steven Lukes says:
From their observation of the fact of moral diversity and their view that this diversity is irreconcilable, moral relativists take the crucial step that defines full-fledged moral relativism. They hold that if the internal, participant’s normative view of morality is taken to be universally applicable, reaching across space and time, then it is untenable. There is, they claim, no unique viewpoint from which moral norms are rationally compelling and universally binding.
In page 85 of this same book, Lukes links moral diversity to Brandt’s “qualified attitudes”, which one should be free from in order for there to exist true moral diversity. These are:
factual disagreement: the relevant facts that different people hold to be true must be impossible to reconcile. For instance, female genital mutilation will be considered immoral and cruel by most Westerners, while members of certain tribal groups will embrace the practice.
self-interested bias: the person judging the facts must not project their own values or interests.
psychological abnormalities: individuals with mental health issues may have difficulty evaluating moral diversity.
According to Lukes, where these three exist, there is moral diversity. We may have difficulty accepting the label “moral” or “morality” for some of the case studies he brings up, but this is exactly what moral diversity entails. We will all be challenged by the so-called “moral” judgment of others.
Moral Diversity and Perspectivism
Epicureans believe in a universe that is infinite and has no center, and therefore all things are physically and naturally relative to each other, and all things must take each other as points of reference. Polystratus, the third Epicurean Scholarch, defended a form of moral realism within the context of relativistic physics: rather than believe that there are no truths, he argued that properties of bodies (and even categories such as “beautiful”, “just”, “pleasant”) are all relative to each other, but they are nonetheless true—just as particles have both innate and relational properties. But Nietzsche posits that there are no truths, only perspectives, and cynically says that truth is a matter of power rather than evidence. He seems to be recognizing that there is an element of choice in our beliefs.
The method of multiple explanations seems in part aligned with this Nietzschean view and seems to accommodate or reconcile it with the Epicurean view. It says that, so long as various explanations do not contradict each other or the evidence of nature, they can all be true at once. Since these interpretations must all be empirically based and not mutually contradictory, the method of multiple explanations establishes natural limits to relativism.
Some philosophers think perspectivism is, in part, the result of language diversity. Johann Gottfried von Herder believed in radical differences in mentalities. Each people have their own happiness, their own mores and ethics, etc.—all bounded by their language.
Other philosophers speculate that there is something known as universal moral grammar, and this might be another way of thinking about Epicurus’ prolepsis of justice, but the concept of universal moral grammar is limited, highly contentious, and faces the same issues raised by language diversity: because this faculty can only find expression in a local setting, it always creates localized expressions of moral judgment.
From all that we have seen, it seems that many of the problems related to moral relativism are impossible to solve, and that we must simply learn to live pragmatically, prudently, pleasantly, and justly—in a world where there is moral diversity.
The Apolitical Stance
Epicurean philosophy has been called anti-post-modern because of its rejection of the idea that all “truths” are equally valid, yet it seems to recognize some of the basic facts of moral diversity, and it recognizes the impossibility of having a single social contract that encompasses all beings. This is echoed in the apolitical stance of the Epicureans.
Universalizing moralities often hide their authoritarian instinct behind the claim of “absolute” or so-called “objective” values, or sometimes under the guise of the “common good” or other utilitarian language. “Objective morality” is the main ghost they like to chase. Sometimes (as in the case of Sam Harris), scientism attempts to become the universalizing narrative, and to replace religion, philosophy, and other activities with a triumphant, naive conception of the powers of science. “Absolute” or so-called “objective” moralities claim as their utility or supposed “benefit” the universal implementation or imposition of said moralities, but in pragmatic terms, this sometimes might require vast and probably never-ending violence to be implemented, as we have seen with the many historical imperial projects of both Christianity and Islam.
Humans are, in practice, polytheistic. Even the many monotheisms often make mutually exclusive claims and require mutually exclusive social contracts, as we are seeing in places like Israel today. For larger moral collections of communities that encompass people with varied religions and ethics, we see that the social contracts that they are able to agree on, are much more generic, and of limited utility, when compared to the ethos of natural communities. Yes, NATO and BRICS are able to unify many countries with shared military and economic interests, and the five pillars of Islam unify a large umma, but these (Platonic, political or imagined) “communities” see themselves in opposition to other large “communities” (anti-Western, hegemonic, or non-Islamic peoples).
The Epicurean insistence on apolitical ethics is, in light of this, an affirmation of communal and personal values and narratives—just as much as it is a rejection of universalizing narratives or the narratives of the polis / city-state. To the extent that we are apolitical, the stories, ceremonies, values, relations, practices, and ethics of our non-Platonic, natural communities gain precedence over the narratives, ideologies, and agendas that are imposed by the polis or by impersonal forces. These values (which are sometimes sacrificed when they become tiny cogs in the large machinery of universalizing narratives) are more personal than those of the polis and dignify the individual and his immediate community.
Kyria Doxa 39
He who best knew how to meet fear of external foes made into one family all the creatures he could; and those he could not, he at any rate did not treat as aliens; and where he found even this impossible, he avoided all association, and, so far as was useful, kept them at a distance. - Principal Doctrine 39
Let us consider the conversations that may have led to the establishment of the doctrines of the first Epicurean communities in light of the above considerations. This is appropriate, if we consider that the first Epicureans lived during the Hellenistic era, when Greece poured itself into the surrounding societies, seeking to benefit them and to absorb many of their elements, and creating a Hellenistic cosmopolitanism that precedes our own globalized cosmopolitanism.
PD 39 is a rejection and critique of the universalizing tendency. It’s in line with the non-aggression values expressed in Principal Doctrine 31—which calls for the prevention of harming and being harmed. It’s a rejection of the possibility or desirability of imposing our values—even our scientific worldview—on everyone, and a rejection of the authoritarian impulse to impose a universal morality on everyone. This is not because our scientific worldview is not valuable or because we do not acknowledge it to be obviously superior in many important ways, but because this imposition may require unnecessary and unwanted violence or conflict.
If two or more people can’t agree on basic premises concerning factual and moral disagreements, they may not be able to negotiate a social contract, a peace, a legal or moral framework that binds them to each other. Their best way to coexist might be mutual avoidance, since conflict resolution in these cases presents special difficulties.
Kyriai Doxai rejects the mutual impositions of values, recognizes personal and communal sovereignty (from which all social contracts are born), and seems pragmatically skeptical of the impulse towards a universal morality.
Doctrine of Eumetry
Principal Doctrine 39 is known among us at SoFE as the Doctrine of Eumetry,
a term coined by aesthetician Panayotis Michelis to denote a non-mathematical and non-symmetrical harmony that can at times even be superior to symmetry–which is often considered an important standard in aesthetics, or the study of beauty. Michelis said that sometimes beauty can be measured in non-standard ways. However, neo-Epicurean French philosopher and historian Michel Onfray adapted this neologism for use in ethics. It comes from the Greek “eu-” (good) and “-metry” is related to measure, or distance, so that it implies keeping “a good distance”, or keeping “a safe distance: not too close, not too far”, as Onfray puts it. Knowing the right distance to keep with many people is meant to guarantee peace of mind.
From our considerations on moral relativity, we can say that eumetry applies not only in interpersonal relations, but that it can also be useful among communities. Therefore, PD 39 serves the pragmatic need of a natural Epicurean community of helping to provide an ethos that unifies it, and also sets its boundaries with other communities—thus protecting it, keeping it distinct, and preserving its identity and values.
