Comparing Syggenis Hedone and Buddha-garbha
Exploring the parallels and issues of transmission
In my last essay, I introduced Epicurus’ doctrine of syggenis hedone (congenital pleasure). Please read that essay prior to this one, as this essay continues developing the ideas in the previous one. Since this is such an important foundational concept in Epicurean ethics and practice, I will dedicate a few more essays to it and refer to it frequently going forward, mainly with the intention of connecting theory and practice. In my next essay, I will focus on Vatican Saying 41 as our easiest go-to practice (though not the only one) for awakening and cultivating the seeds of syggenis hedone. In this installment, I wish to differentiate syggenis hedone from similar ideas that exist in Mahayana Buddhism, keeping in mind that the comparative study of Epicurean philosophy and other traditions is an opportunity to practice the method of multiple interpretations (and to test its limits, so as to avoid cognitive dissonance).
Hongaku: Original Enlightenment
In Japanese Buddhism, hongaku translates as original enlightenment. It’s a Mahayana Buddhist interpretation of Buddha’s awakening in a manner that focuses on this world. The notion of innate, or original awakening was developed by the Tendai School. It’s derived from “The Awakening of Faith” sutra and in the Jodo Shinshu lineage it’s tied to shinjin (true faith, or entrusting the mind). Hongaku implies that there’s something inherent, innate, intrinsic about enlightenment, and (most importantly) that enlightenment is not something that one achieves after many lifetimes of effort (as the earlier Theravada Buddhist lineage teaches), but here and now.
Enlightenment is often described, in the Mahayana lineages that accept hongaku, as insight into “suchness” or “thusness”. This is a direct, clear insight into the nature of things. Epicurus approaches a similar concept when he points to enargeia (the quality of direct or immediate experience) as a feature of the unmediated apprehension of the nature of things that we achieve with the use of the canonical faculties.
Hongaku has multiple interpretations. According to one, it’s the view that all sentient beings are already enlightened or awakened in some way, and it’s tied to the concept of Buddha nature. This type of interpretation of awakening, enlightenment, or salvation is similar in many ways to how Epicurus views pleasure. Many Buddhists of the Tientai and Nichiren lineages have interpreted Chapter 16 of the Lotus Sutra as teaching the original enlightenment of all sentient beings. Titled “On conceiving of the lifespan of the Thus-gone-one”, this chapter claims that Buddha has existed from the most remote antiquity, long before the historical Shakyamuni Buddha was born on planet Earth. These lineages interpret this as referring to Buddha-nature rather than the historical Shakyamuni Buddha.
There seems to be a strong Taoist influence in this interpretation of enlightenment. Like Epicurus, Zen masters often appeal to the cradle argument to justify original enlightenment just as Taoist masters appeal to it to teach ziran (authenticity) and the ideal of living according to nature. They call for a return to a natural state prior to acculturation.
The salvific or liberational repercussions are somewhat similar in both the hongaku and the syggenis hedone discourse: all sentient beings have some innate pleasure potential, bliss-potential, and other faculties necessary for living a happy life as part of their nature, and to the extent that we educate and discipline ourselves to awaken these faculties correctly, we can work out our own salvation from suffering.
Both doctrines teach that this innate pleasure or enlightenment is rooted in our very nature and stress that it is directly accessible, even in the case of people with limited abilities, and so both doctrines emancipate us from external authorities (priests, logicians, states) and have an empowering effect. Both point to a short, straight, and relatively easy path to salvation.
Both focus on this-world here-and-now and reject an otherworldly focus (this is what distinguishes hongaku from other interpretations of Buddhist salvation).
Both doctrines have been unfairly accused by enemies of being antinomian or immoral, and that if they are true there is no need to practice anything, but the pragmatic reality is that Buddhists (even those who insist on immanent interpretations) and Epicureans have always had a large variety of practices and pro-social behaviors. The scholar Jackeline Stone (whose writings have been quite helpful in my investigations for this essay) also points to the “weakening of causal links between moral conduct and liberation” as a feature of hongaku, which we also notice in Epicurus—not that he is amoral, but his ethical focus is on appropriate views, on accurate insight, and other natural causes of pleasures (friendships, management of desires, etc.)
As Buddhism in recent decades has become increasingly self-critical, controversy has arisen over the repercussions and ethical implications of this doctrine. Some scholars see original enlightenment thought as affirming nature and accommodating phenomenal realities. Others see it as a dangerous antinomianism that undermines both religious discipline and moral standards. Some go as far as denouncing original enlightenment thought as an authoritarian ideology that, by sacralizing all things just as they are, in effect bolsters the status quo and legitimates social injustice, but Stone argues that these criticisms are decontextualized and invites us to consider the utility of the doctrine.
Another broad, insightful observation on the parallels—specifically between the Epicurean, Taoist, and Zen lineages—lies in the emphasis on unlearning, rather than learning. The masters of these three lineages all emphasize that since enlightenment/pleasure is instant and original, we must unlearn culture rather than learn it, at least to an extent that allows us to return to this original nature. Lao-tse wants his disciples to go back to the wild and natural state of an uncut piece of wood that has not yet been sculpted. Epicurus was very critical of Greek education. Since humans inevitably create culture, this in practice does not ban all culture, but instead creates a new culture of self-cultivation.
The Non-Conceptual Problem
In our study of the Epicurean canon, we learned that pleasure (like all the other canonical faculties) is non-rational (alogos). The Epicurean canon of truth contains non-conceptual sources of information about nature, and this raises issues concerning transmission. Explaining its intricacies by means that break down the supremacy of reason—particularly when we have to teach the role of pleasure within the canon—is sometimes useful or necessary.
The non-conceptual or non-rational nature of these insights is not a problem in itself. As I see it, the problem this poses for sincere Epicurean practitioners and propagators might be one of assimilation of insights and of transmission, with which individuals with different natures, tendencies, and histories will experience varying degrees of difficulty. One major challenge that we face in understanding and expounding this doctrine within the context of the Western philosophical tradition is that we have inherited a tradition that is obsessed with logic and reason, and where the non-rational faculties are often either dismissed or disparaged. One of the potential advantages of transmission with regards to the syggenis hedone doctrine over other similar teachings is that it presents us with an opportunity to explain precisely and clearly its theory and praxis, in a manner that easily evades the mystification that surrounds interpretations of “buddha nature”.
While there are clear similarities with Buddha nature, these similarities are limited by the fact that the Buddhist concept is obscured by mystification and supernatural claims that are not very useful to an Epicurean. For instance, Buddha-nature is sometimes explained as “luminous mind”, which is not very clear or helpful. For another example: some Tientai lineages have claimed that non-sentient bodies have Buddha nature. But we observe that bliss is a property only of sentient bodies. If we wanted to be generous, we could tie this to the link between enlightenment and one’s environment, since all things are contextual, and we may even argue that there’s a parallel to this in Epicurus’ qualifying statement (from the Letter to Menoeceus) that we will only live like makaria zoa (blissful beings) IF we are surrounded by immortal goods, which indicates the need for an environment conducive to bliss. While this is true, I’m not sure I want to be so generous as to attribute bliss to a stone or water. Instead, I would favor seeing this tendency to express Buddha-nature in unclear and mystified language as an opportunity for Epicureans to posit our alternative, syggenis hedone, to practice clarity of speech and to demystify spirituality, rendering it natural, scientific, and physical.
Our ongoing exploration of syggenis hedone is an opportunity to develop a demystified perspective as opposed to mystified notions of buddha-nature or original enlightenment which are helpful, but only to a limited extent, to refer to our seed of innate bliss potential. I see Epicureanism as containing the germ of a contemplative science, theory, and practice by which one can develop a fully scientific spiritual practice, and a specifically Epicurean conception of true, ordinary enlightenment.
I sympathize with Buddhist scholars because both innate pleasure and Buddha-nature (being non-rational) are not always easy to put into words. However, we are able to easily have clear and direct insight on innate pleasure.
The Epicurean lineage focuses on simple, plain speech in order to communicate ideas clearly, but this does not always do justice to the insights of the teachings. Although Colotes rejected the use of parables and myths to transmit philosophical wisdom, Lucretius did us a great favor when he saw the need for parables and explored methods of transmission that were outside of the inherited norms within the lineage. I am reminded of the Buddhist parable of the jewel in the cloak, where a rich friend secretly hides a gem in a poor man’s cloak. The poor man goes about his life in destitution, degrading himself without knowing that he is rich and fortunate, only to later find out that he had a treasure with him all along. Could this parable and similar ones related to Buddha-nature not be applied just as well to innate pleasure?
Lucian of Samosata, in the Isle of the Blessed portion of his True Story, offers us imagery of wells of laughter and wells of pleasure as metaphors for our sources of blessedness. In De rerum natura, Lucretius offers us many more parables native to our lineage (the banquet, the alphabet, the conquest of Mars by Venus, etc.)
Other than parables, contemplative practices can help us to gain non-linear insights and cultivate non-rational faculties. Many meditators within the Buddhist and yogic traditions report that when conceptual processes abate, the mind naturally becomes blissful because it returns to its own nature. This is hard to convey but can be grasped by direct experience and by exertion of the correct contemplative practices, the benefits of many of which are documented in scientific studies. Most importantly, this intuitively aligns with our previous meleta on pleasure as the default state of the organism.
The link between non-conceptual disciplines of the soul and pleasure is explained by Thupten Jinpa in What Is the Relationship between Bliss and Emptiness? Jinpa is a lama in the Vajrayana (Tibetan) tradition, and he says that when the mind ceases conceptual processes, bliss naturally arises. This is one of the insights gained by advanced meditators in the Tibetan lineage. The idea here is that what is keeping us from experiencing blissful states is the constant stream of conceptual processes, which act as a dam on the natural currents of pleasure that are inherent to our nature. With the help of insight and by taming the mind, we can train ourselves to cultivate mindstreams that will be less disruptive of the natural flow of bliss.
The bottom line with regards to the challenge of Epicurean transmission in the case of pleasure is that it is both non-conceptual as well as ineffable. It cannot be communicated, only experienced directly. The Greeks associated ineffability with the experience of their mysteries. Buddha-nature (like the canonical, innate pleasure of the Epicureans) is of this ineffable quality: it cannot be fully explained in words, it’s unintelligible or inexplicable, and can only be directly experienced. Therefore, Buddhist methods of transmission may, at times, serve as useful models for artful Epicurean transmission of syggenis hedone, but only to a limited extent (as we have seen).
Buddhist Kleshas and Epicurean Perturbations
Epicurus does not directly say that conceptual processes act as a blockage on pleasure, but he did speak of perturbations as the things that impede our pleasure—or as the signs of things that impede it—, which upon evaluation are in most cases tied to kenodoxia (false views, false opinions, or false doctrines). He also placed pleasure in the canon or standard of truth (which includes only non-rational faculties that furnish a direct, unmediated connection with the nature of things), and by doing this he strictly separated pleasures from opinions and rational processes.
Many of the perturbations that Epicurus acknowledged are tied to acculturation and indoctrination into unnatural and false views. Perturbations are hindrances that impede the seeds of syggenis hedone (congenital pleasure) from flourishing, and they include emotions and the opinions or cognitive processes on which they are based. Some of these perturbations are mentioned directly in Kyriai Doxai 17 (the perturbation of having been unjust), 22 (the perturbations of doubt and confusion), and implied in other Doxai (fears of gods and death in 1 and 2, the perturbation of guilt in 35, etc.), and Philodemus deals with many other perturbations at length. In Diogenes’ Wall Inscription we find how these perturbations relate pragmatically to innate pleasure.
Let us now [investigate] how life is to be made pleasant for us both in states and in actions.
Let us first discuss states, keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions which disturb the soul are removed, those which produce pleasure enter into it to take their place.
Well, what are the disturbing emotions? [They are] fears —of the gods, of death, and of [pains]— and, besides [these], desires that [outrun] the limits fixed by nature. These are the roots of all evils, and, [unless] we cut them off, [a multitude] of evils will grow [upon] us.
That the above quote mirrors the central message of Tathagathabargha Sutra (“Scripture on Buddha-nature”) demonstrates that there are additional similarities between the Epicurean conception of perturbations and the Buddhist conception of kleshas (“defilements” or hindrances to enlightenment that obscure Buddha-nature). What these hindrances consist of specifically varies in both traditions.
Another parallel accentuated in both traditions is that these hindrances are not part of the innate nature but are added, in the case of Epicurus, by culture (they are artificial). The term used in English translations of Buddhist sources is that the kleshas are “adventitious”, which is defined as:
: coming from another source and not inherent or innate
: arising or occurring sporadically or in other than the usual location
We see that care is taken in both traditions to separate that which is innate from that which is not. Here, the use of “adventitious” leads us to think of a klesha as a type of accidental (and unnecessary) property of sentient bodies, something external (as opposed to the innate, natural quality of Epicurean pleasure and Buddha nature), just as perturbations are external and not inherent to our nature—in other words, they do not partake of the “syggenis” (congenital) property that Epicurus ascribes to pleasure.
Roman Empress Plotina called Epicurus her Savior. One way to think about perturbations is to ask: what did philosophy save Plotina FROM? What does it save us FROM?
By studying kleshas and perturbations side by side, we gain insight into the practical utility of these concepts within their respective systems. Tathagatagarbha (Buddha-nature)’s goal is not merely theoretical but salvific. Just as perturbations must be removed to make room for our innate pleasure, similarly these adventitious kleshas obscure buddha nature, and are used pragmatically to accentuate that all beings have the potential for Buddhahood, if only these hindrances or defilements could be overcome. It helps practitioners to contextualize practice as a process of healing from these avoidance-worthy defilements by persistently taking refuge in choice-worthy Buddha-nature, just as Epicurean practitioners seek to avoid sources of perturbations and choose pleasures.
An additional utility of studying the perturbations/kleshas together is that they help us to understand why it is that a practice is needed, if we are already enlightened or if we already have innate pleasure. The main point of hongaku is not that we should not practice because we are already Buddhas, but that we must practice as if we were already enlightened. That is the technique of hongaku practice: to help the practitioner to identify with and become anchored in the better part of themself.
One of the repercussions of original enlightenment thought is that the Buddhist sects that accept this interpretation (rather than the reincarnation-based Theravada conception of attaining nirvana after eons of countless lives) tend to have a positive, affirming attitude in general towards desires. For instance, Nichiren Daishonin taught that the passions are exactly the same as enlightenment, in other words, they can become enlightened and redeemed if used, applied, and understood with the correct attitude and practice.
On the Results of Rejecting Suggenis Hedone
Another aspect of the doctrine of syggenis hedone deserves to be considered in our comparison of Epicureanism versus Buddhism. Oftentimes Buddhist sutras (scriptures) declare that a person will get “bad karma” if they reject or disparage some important belief, teaching, or sutra. While we do not believe in karmic reactions as Eastern religions do, we should consider the pragmatic repercussions of rejecting belief in syggenis hedone. Epicurus did express concerns about kenodoxia (empty views) and their harmful repercussions, and he did stress correct views.
The massive meta-study by Paul Gregory links numerous statistics that show the correlation between high levels of religiosity and societal dysfunction, which includes data concerning violent crime, prison statistics, teen pregnancy, educational achievement, etc. All of these factors are tied to the increased poverty which also coincides statistically with higher levels of religiosity. As we have seen in countries like Iran, higher levels of educational achievement and of prosperity have made the population less religious. These statistical studies show that the spread of certain varieties of kenodoxai is harmful to people’s happiness, delays societal progress, harms stability, and diminishes prosperity. It also shows the practical repercussions of holding certain beliefs. Our beliefs do have repercussions and must be chosen carefully.
To some Christians who come from sects that taught them to hate their bodies, there is something medicinal about Epicurus’ doctrine of congenital pleasure. It advances a reconciliation with the pleasure potential, with the body, and with nature. If rather than believe (as the churches teach) that we are born sinful and naturally evil, we can truly accept that we are naturally good and that we have an innate happiness potential as part of our constitution, then we will have a healthier morale and sense of dignity. This doctrine gives many reasons to consider happiness a thing that is easy to achieve, and it gives hope. Concerning “faith”,
Some texts, such as the Shinnyo kan, hold that the deluded realms of experience and the whole samsaric process originate from failure to discern or believe in one’s identity with “suchness that is original enlightenment”. - Jacqueline Stone, Original Enlightenment and the Transformation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism, page 356
Kyria Doxa 28 stresses that there are certain things that must be known with clear conviction for the sake of our happiness. In a future essay, I will delve into choice-worthy knowledge. Here, I wish to stress that innate pleasure is a salvific gnosis the knowledge of which makes a huge difference in our practice and quality of life. It serves as an antidote to depression and hopelessness. But this does not mean that faith in it or conviction is enough, and that practice is not needed.
This is probably the greatest paradigm shift that may emerge from asking the correct questions about this doctrine: syggenis hedone helps us to contextualize how we practice our technologies of the self. If we understand that our exercises, practices, and hedonic regimen are methods of awakening and cultivating our pleasure potential, it becomes much easier to justify these practices, to methodically and systematically apply them, and to organize ourselves around them with the correct understanding. Rejection of this doctrine makes us less hopeful and less pragmatic, in my view.
Conclusion
The many parallels between hongaku and syggenis hedone and between kleshas and perturbations help us to understand the practical utility of these doctrines, but I believe Epicurean philosophy challenges us to articulate these ideas more clearly in our native languages, in a manner that renders them useful. This should be an ongoing process. I invite my readers to compile your own outlines and commentaries on innate pleasure, to list all the pragmatic repercussions of this teaching in your own words, and to share your insights with other Epicureans.
